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This paper studies the determinants of portfolio capital flows to emerging Europe along with the 
spillover effects of U.S. monetary policy on the region’s portfolio investment inflows. Using a 
sample of eleven emerging European countries over the period from 2000Q1 to 2018Q3, this 
paper employs five fixed-effects regressions that include combinations of exogenous push and 
domestic structural pull factors as explanatory variables for portfolio flows to emerging Europe. 
My results suggest that U.S. monetary policy is only a secondary driver of portfolio equity flows 
to the region and rather domestic factors including capital inflow restrictions, institutional 
quality, and Eurozone membership are the most significant and consistent determinants. This 
paper contributes to the existing literature by not only studying emerging Europe as a whole, but 
also differentiating between Emerging and Frontier Market economies. I found that again 
especially for Frontier Markets domestic variables were the main drivers of portfolio inflows, but 
U.S. monetary policy and expected GDP growth differentials were also significant in driving 





Ever since the 1997 Asian financial crisis, “hot” portfolio flows to Emerging Market 
countries (EMs) have been a widely debated subject. When the Federal Reserve Bank (Fed) cut 
its policy interest rate to a record low range of 0 to 0.25% in December 2008 along with 
introducing Quantitative Easing (QE), many EM leaders expressed their disapproval with United 
States (U.S.). monetary policy measures.1 Then Brazilian President, Dilma Rousseff, complained 
to U.S. President Barack Obama that extremely loose U.S. monetary policy generated excess 
speculative money that flooded into EMs, leading to “overvalued local currencies and 
uncompetitive factories, thus impairing growth in emerging countries" (Lyons and Barkley, 
2012). With western advanced economies’ (AEs) policy rates at or new the zero-lower bound, 
investors allocated a larger share of investments to developing economies in a search for yield. 
Figures 1 and 2 show the increase in speculative portfolio debt and equity inflows to emerging 
Europe as a response to U.S. QE following the global financial crisis (GFC). Capital inflows 
bring many benefits such as providing capital and growth, increasing productive capacity, and 
lowering unemployment. However, they can also be inflationary, create asset bubbles, appreciate 
the local currency, and wreak havoc in vulnerable developing countries if or when the flows 
reverse (Pettinger, 2018). The volatility of portfolio flows to emerging Europe has increased 
meaningfully since the onset of the GFC, and high and low episodes seem to correspond to U.S. 
monetary policy announcements and actions (see Figures 1 and 2).  
It is encouraging that the U.S. economy has been strong enough to withstand nine interest 
rate hikes (arguably more if one counts the balance sheet runoff) since the Fed started to 
normalize interest rates in 2015. However, the Fed and policymakers around the world should 
                                                 
1 QE involved the buying of mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and U.S. Treasury notes to increase liquidity and 
further ease financial conditions in the U.S. 
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also consider the secondary spillover effects U.S. monetary policies have on developing 
countries. Global financial stability is in the best interest of U.S. firms, financial markets, and the 
economy, and in an interconnected, globalized world, U.S. monetary policy decisions have 
global implications that can have disruptive feedback effects on the U.S. economy itself. As a 
result, the spillover effects of U.S. conventional and unconventional monetary policy on capital 
flows and real economic impacts on EMs is widely discussed in economic research (e.g., Ahmed 
and Zlate, 2014; Chen et al., 2014; Byrne and Fiess, 2015; Georgiadis, 2016; etc.); however, 
emerging Europe is an understudied region compared to emerging Asia and Latin America (e.g., 
Grenville, 2014; Marfatia, 2016, etc.), especially with regards to portfolio flows. This paper adds 
to the existing literature and aims to answer three questions: 1) Do emerging European 
economies experience spillover effects from U.S. conventional and unconventional monetary 
policies, 2) What are the main determinants of portfolio equity and debt inflows to emerging 
Europe, and 3) Are there significant differences between portfolio equity and debt investments 
by non-residents to EM and frontier market (FM) economies.    
Emerging Europe is comprised of several smaller, middle-sized Eastern European countries 
and much bigger Greece and Turkey. With an average annual GDP growth rate of 6.5% over the 
five years leading up to the GFC, emerging Europe was one of the fastest growing regions in the 
world (Eller et al., 2014). The region’s incredible growth phase was driven by outsized 
international capital flows to the area as well as increasing trade integration with the EU. It also 
drove credit growth, a rise in asset prices, and increased domestic demand. GDP growth financed 
by credit expansion (largely denominated in foreign currencies) led to an increase in financial 
vulnerability in the region that was exposed with the onset of the GFC (Eller et al., 2014).   
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On top of that, the region’s strong ties to the European Union (EU) exposed the countries to 
slow growth as well as the subsequent European sovereign debt crisis. All of this led to a 
substantial slowdown in capital inflows to emerging Europe as a whole, but with differences 
between countries. While Poland and Turkey shared favorable management of the GFC, most 
other countries entered deep recessions; it took most eastern European countries until the second 
half of 2014 to surpass their pre-crisis GDP levels (Feldkircher, 2015). Poland was the only 
country in the EU not to experience a recession in 2009. Since 2009 it has managed to grow its 
GDP on average by 3.5% annually, posting an incredible growth rate of 5.1% in 2018 compared 
to 1.9% for the Euro area. Over the two years following the GFC when investors were in a 
“search for yield,” Poland and Turkey were two of the biggest recipients of foreign capital flows 
in emerging Europe. These different fates for various emerging European countries and strong 
economic ties with Western Europe and the world, highlight the importance of examining the 
drivers of international capital flows to these countries. Recently, policy institutions such as the 
European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) started to analyze growth 
spillovers shocks to Eastern Europe. Using a VAR model, EBRD (2012) found that important 
country-specific characteristics can explain stronger or weaker vulnerability to external shocks 
for Central, Eastern, and Southeastern European (CESEE) countries. Another branch of research 
focuses on the effect of European Central Bank (ECB) monetary policy shocks on emerging 
Europe; however, current literature on the drivers of portfolio flows to emerging Europe is sparse 
with most research focusing on foreign direct investment (FDI) flows (Caccia and Pavlova, 
2018). While emerging Asia and Latin America have garnered lots of academic attention with 
regards to capital flows, emerging Europe is an understudied region (e.g., Grenville, 2014; 
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Marfatia, 2016, etc.). Emerging Europe has become the main engine of growth in Europe, and as 
such, it is imperative to investigate the drivers of portfolio flows to the area.  
In order to investigate the determinants of portfolio debt and equity inflows to emerging 
European economies, I use central bank policy rate differentials between emerging European 
countries and the U.S. federal funds target rate as a measure of conventional monetary policy and 
large-scale asset purchases by the Fed as a proxy for unconventional monetary policy. My panel 
regressions control for both country and time fixed effects and includes a vector of external 
variables (sovereign bond spread differentials, expected GDP growth differentials, and risk 
aversion/VIX)  and country-specific characteristics (capital inflow restrictions, institutional 
quality, financial development, current account balance, inflation, and EU and Eurozone (EZ) 
membership) to find additional drivers of portfolio investments to the region. The underlying 
quarterly data on gross debt and equity portfolio inflows covers the period from 2000Q1 to 
2018Q3 and includes eleven emerging European countries divided into five EMs and six FMs 
(Table 1). I estimate five different specifications of my model including variations of external 
and domestic variables all lagged by two quarters. Overall, the independent variables for 
portfolio bond inflows come in statistically significant, have mostly the expected sign, and carry 
economically significant magnitudes on the estimates. The results suggest that capital inflow 
restrictions, institutional quality, and EU and EZ memberships are all significant drivers of 
portfolio bond flows to emerging Europe. EU and EZ membership increase debt inflows as a 
percentage of GDP by 4.21% to 5.76%. Similarly, a one unit increase in institutional quality 
increases the debt-dependent variable by 10.99% to 14.08%. Results for portfolio equity inflows 
are mostly insignificant; only central bank policy rate differentials, capital inflow restrictions, 
and EZ membership are significant. As the policy rate of emerging European countries increases 
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by 1% relative to the fed funds rate, equity investments as a percentage of GDP rise by 0.03%. 
Additionally, a one unit increase in the capital inflow restrictions index decreases portfolio 
equity inflows as a percentage of GDP by 1.29% to 2.07%.  
In the second part of my analysis, I divide the sample into EMs and FMs. To my knowledge, 
no other paper thus far differentiates between EMs and FMs, and even just taking a look at the 
summary statistics (Tables 4 and 5) reveals significant disparities between the groups. On 
average, EMs are more financially developed, have better institutions, and experience portfolio 
equity and debt inflows twice as large as FMs (see Tables 4 and 5). The difference in country 
characteristics is largely due to structural reason, while portfolio flow disparities are due to 
investor dynamics. EM fund managers usually have investment restrictions such as minimum 
market cap and risk tolerance and are typically legally only allowed to invest in EM securities. 
Additionally, since the GFC EM index funds have risen in popularity accumulating trillions of 
dollars in assets under management (AUM). The largest EM index fund has $29.3 billion in 
AUM, and as of November 2017, the MSCI EM series has $1.6 trillion in AUM benchmarked to 
it (MSCI, 2017). On the other hand, FM index funds are still scarce; the largest FM index fund 
currently has a mere $512.5 million in AUM (Blackrock, 2019).       
The sub-group results for portfolio debt inflows show that central bank policy rate 
differentials, inflation, and EU and EZ membership are statistically significant for emerging 
Europe’s EMs, while capital inflow restrictions, financial development, inflation, and EZ 
membership are drivers for FMs. A one percentage point increase in central bank policy rate 
differential increases EM portfolio debt investment as a percentage of GDP by 0.06%. On the 
other hand, a one unit increase in financial development increases FM portfolio debt investment 
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as a percentage of GDP by 17.49% to 23.13%. Similar to the full sample, EZ membership and 
institutional quality are the most consistent determinants for both groups. 
The story for portfolio equity inflows is somewhat different, as generally fewer results are 
statistically significant. For EM portfolio equity flows central bank policy rate differentials is the 
most consistent statistically significant variable along with expected GDP growth differentials, 
capital inflow restrictions, and institutional quality. In contrast, LSAP, EU, and EZ membership 
are the main determinants of portfolio equity inflows for FMs. In summary, while there are 
significant U.S. monetary spillover effects to the full sample and EMs via central bank policy 
rate differentials, domestic factors are the main drivers of portfolio flows to emerging Europe. 
Further, this paper finds significant differences in the magnitude and the direction of 
determinants for EMs and FMs, which suggest future researchers should be careful when 
deciding on what countries to study, differentiating between EMs and FMs.     
The results of this paper carry important policy implications for emerging European 
policymakers. In recent history, EMs have usually come under pressure during episodes of large 
capital flow outflows (e.g., 1997 Asian financial crisis and GFC). The increase in globalization 
and global financial market integration in the last decade has made it significantly easier for 
people to invest abroad and increased the magnitude and volatility of capital flows to EMs. As 
such, it is vital for policymakers to understand what drives investment in and out of the country 
in order to manage the magnitude and volatility of flows and prevent another crisis. 
My results suggest that domestic variables such as capital inflow restrictions (financial 
openness), institutional quality, and EZ membership are the most significant drivers of portfolio 
flows to both EMs and FMs in emerging Europe. This implies that emerging European 
governments should focus on domestic variables they actually can control and continue to 
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strengthen them. I find that for FMs trade integration in the form of EZ membership significantly 
increases both portfolio equity and debt inflows as a percentage of GDP. Governments are taking 
notice of the benefits that come with the European monetary union. Half of FMs (Estonia, 
Lithuania, and Slovenia) already joined the EZ and adopted the Euro as their primary currency 
while Croatia and Romania are on the enlargement agenda and are expected to join in 2022 and 
2025 (European Commission, 2019).     
This paper contributes to the existing literature in four key ways. Most of the current 
literature on capital flows (e.g., Ahmed and Zlate, 2014; Byrne and Fiess; 2015, Hannan, 2017 
etc.) set out to find what factors drive different types of capital flows to samples of AE and EM 
or just EM countries, but to my knowledge no other paper thus far differentiates between EMs 
and FMs to find the drivers of capital flows to each and compare and contrast the findings. 
Similarly, Allegret and Sallenave (2015) and Eller et al. (2014) analyzed the determinants of 
short-term interest rates and U.S. monetary policy shocks for samples of emerging European 
countries, while Fratzscher (2012) examined the effect of a vector of common/global shocks and 
domestic factors on net capital flows to AEs and EMs in different regions including Europe. This 
paper seeks to expand current research on emerging Europe to include the drivers of gross 
portfolio debt and equity inflows to EMs and FMs (excluding AEs) in the region. Also, several 
papers (e.g., Keskinsoy, 2015; Chen et al., 2017) have studied the spillover effect of ECB 
monetary policy on EMs in Europe and around the world, and I seek to expand on this research 
by examining the spillover effects of U.S. monetary policy path on emerging Europe. Lastly, I 
incorporate regional EM and EZ dummy variables into Ahmed and Zlate (2014) and Hannan’s 
(2016) regression models.  
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The rest of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 reviews the theoretical background 
on international capital flows; Section 3 reviews previous research on the spillover effects of 
U.S. monetary policies and determinants of capital flows to EMs; Section 4 discusses the data 
and data sources; Section 5 reviews earlier methodologies and lays out the empirical framework 
of this paper; Section 6 reports the results for the full sample and EMs and FMs separately; 
Section 7 discusses policy implications; and Section 8 concludes, providing paths for future 
research and discussing study limitations. 
 
2 Theoretical Background on International Capital Flows 
The literature makes use of a wide variety of concepts and ideas, so before delving into the 
determinants of international capital flows it is helpful to define the theoretical framework, 
mechanisms, and components of capital flows.  
 
2.1.1 Net vs. Gross Capital Flows 
In its simplest terms, international capital flows are the financial side of international trade 
between countries. A country that imports more goods and services than it exports is running a 
current account (CA) deficit. As a result of this overconsumption, foreign countries will hold 
financial claims against the deficit country which are recorded as a balance in the capital flow 
account. In essence money/financial claims flow from the deficit country to the trading partner 
while goods and services go the other way. Consequently, net capital flows offset the CA 
balance (adjusted for net errors and omission, and changes in foreign exchange reserves), 
meaning a current account deficit is typically financed through positive net capital flows. Net 
capital flows and the current account balance give us a good idea about the trade in real goods 
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and services, but they do not capture the much larger quantities of financial transactions of 
today’s global financial system (Koepke, 2015).  
Contrary to net capital flows, gross capital flows differentiate between foreign investment 
into the host country and resident outward investment. Gross capital flows capture the exchange 
of assets for other assets including international lending, borrowing, and financial intermediation 
(Koepke, 2015). Both net and gross capital flows are important for comprehending the intricacies 
of capital flows, but for the purpose of understanding the spillover effect of U.S. monetary policy 
and drivers of capital flows to emerging Europe the theoretical benefits of gross international 
capital flows are most appropriate.   
 
2.1.2 Residency of Investor 
 Analyzing gross capital flows means differentiating between non-resident capital inflows 
and resident capital outflows. Within the IMF Balance of Payments (BoP), capital inflows are 
considered liabilities because they are claims against domestic assets while capital outflows are 
claims on foreign assets and as such considered assets. I use gross capital inflows to emerging 
Europe because non-resident flows are considered more volatile and foreign investors behavior 
typically affect EMs economies the most (Koepke, 2015).     
 
2.1.3 Capital flow components 
The main components of capital flows are FDI, portfolio equity investment, portfolio 
debt investment, and other investments/bank lending. Academic literature differentiates between 
these components because they usually drastically vary in scale, scope, and volatility, and so do 
the determinants that drive them.  
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FDI involves an investment by an individual or a firm in the form of controlling 
ownership and or a significant degree of influence over the decision-making process in a foreign 
enterprise. FDI flows to emerging markets are less volatile, more persistent, and decline by 
smaller amounts during extreme episodes because they usually involve ownership of illiquid 
assets such as physical equipment and plants (Eichengreen et al., 2017). Due to this illiquidity 
issue, FDI flows are less fickle and primarily driven by long-term domestic structural factors. 
Hannan and Pagliari (2017) found that per capita income, trade openness, and capital account 
openness are the most important drivers of FDI flow volatility. Especially for emerging market 
economies, FDI flows are essential because they provide the largest source of external financing, 
contributing 40% to 60% of aggregate capital flows since the 1990s (Institute of International 
Finance, 2015).         
Portfolio equity and debt flows make up all other cross-border transactions involving debt 
or equity securities. They are investments in foreign bond or equity markets (bonds and stocks) 
where the investor does not exhibit control or a significant degree of influence over the decision-
making process of a firm. These transactions can be executed very quickly as investors can 
adjust their portfolio holdings within seconds to economic or company-specific news, changes in 
risk preference, and short-term fluctuations in financial markets. As a result, Eichengreen et al. 
(2017) found that portfolio debt and equity flows are slightly more volatile than FDI flows. 
Similarly, Hannan and Pagliari’s (2017) results indicated that along with per capita income and 
real GDP growth, risk appetite (as measured by the VIX) and oil prices are significant 
determinants of portfolio equity and debt flow volatility.      
Lastly, “other investments,” often also referred to as bank lending, is a residual category 
that includes cross-country bank claims such as bank lending, trade credits, and advances, special 
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drawing rights, and currency and deposits. Eichengreen et al. (2017) found that bank lending 
flows are the least persistent, most volatile, and drop most abruptly during extreme episodes. 
Because the various components of capital flows react differently to external and internal 
variables, I focus on portfolio debt and equity inflows to emerging Europe.  
 
3 Literature Review 
International capital flows play an essential role in the global economy and bring a host of 
benefits and risks to recipient countries. They impact macroeconomic policy decisions and are 
firmly in the center of a countries’ economic, financial and political conditions (Koepke, 2015). 
Especially for EMs these capital flows can be rather large relative to their financial institutions 
and have the potential to create significant domestic financial volatility. Hence, understanding 
the main drivers of capital flows to EMs is an important policy issue, which is reflected in the 
substantial academic interest the topic has received over time (Koepke, 2015). 
 
3.1 Main Drivers 
The role of capital inflows in EMs was first pioneered by Calvo et al. (1993) and following 
their research Fernandez-Arias (1996) formally introduced the concept of “push and pull factors” 
to distinguish different drivers of capital flows. “Push” factors are external in nature such as 
global risk aversion and advanced markets’ (AM) monetary policy that push capital from AMs 
into EMs. On the other hand, “pull” factors are country-specific domestic factors in recipient 
countries including trade openness and institutional quality that attract foreign investors to buy 
domestic financial assets.  
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Byrne and Fiess (2015) analyzed the nature and determinants of aggregate (equity, bond, and 
bank portfolio flows combined) and disaggregate capital inflows for up to 46 EMs. They used 
quarterly equity, bond, and bank inflow data from 1993Q1 to 2009Q1 and examined the data 
with a Panel Analysis of Nonstationary in Idiosyncratic and Common Components (PANIC) 
model along with a panel regression. They went beyond the existing literature at the time by 
considering not just global “push” but also domestic country-specific “pull” variables in their 
study. The results indicate some commonalities in capital inflows, but they differ slightly based 
on aggregate or disaggregate inflow data. Byrne and Fiess (2015) found commodity prices, U.S. 
long-run interest rates, and most importantly global risk appetite to be important determinants for 
equity inflows, while “pull” factors seem to be important for bond inflows. De jure financial 
openness (as measured by the Chinn and Ito (2006) index) and the quality of institutions were 
significant for bond flows to EMs.2,3 A fall in U.S. long-term interest rates and the resulting 
lower return in bond yields causes investors to redirect capital to EMs in a “search for yield.” 
Similarly, an increase in global risk appetite is associated with capital inflows for EMs. Byrne 
and Fiess’ (2015) results indicate that both global “push” and domestic “pull” variables 
determine capital flows to EMs. However, it is unclear how the authors chose the countries in 
their sample, and due to a lack of data the countries are not consistent across samples/regression; 
this leads to inconsistencies in the results and introduces a potential bias.   
Fratzscher (2012) conducted a similar study to that of Byrne and Fiess (2015), in which he 
analyzed the heterogeneity of AMs and EMs to global shocks (i.e., the GFC) and the relative 
importance of common “push” factors and country-specific “pull” factors. He differentiated 
                                                 
2 The Chinn-Ito-index measures a country's degree of capital account openness. It is “based on capital account 
transactions, and the extent of capital controls and their data are based upon the IMF’s Annual Report on 
Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions” (Byrne and Fiess, 2015).  
3 Quality of institutions is based upon the PRS group’s International Country Risk Guide. 
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between gross equity and bond flows in analyzing a sample of 50 AMs and EMs. Fratzscher 
(2012) focused on a more recent time period and compared the role of different drivers of global 
capital flows during the GFC and the subsequent recovery. His results show that the main 
determinants of capital flows during the GFC were global “push” factors such as liquidity and 
risk (proxied by the VIX index); however, the signs of the model parameter changed during the 
GFC compared to before.4 While an increase in risk before the GFC was associated with capital 
flows out of AEs and into EMs, this effect reversed during the GFC inducing a substantial 
reallocation of capital from many EMs into a few AEs (Fratzscher, 2012).  
Additionally, the paper found that domestic “pull” factors have been vital in directing capital 
flows in the 2009-10 recovery. In line with other research, Fratzscher (2012) found that the most 
critical domestic factors are institutions, macroeconomic fundamentals, and domestic policies. 
These are all variables that I include in my panel regression, but I apply them to emerging 
Europe rather than a seemingly randomly selected sample of AMs and EMs.     
Forbes and Warnock (2012) presented a framework for examining extreme episodes of 
capital flows, which they grouped into four categories: surges (of non-resident inflows), stops (of 
non-resident inflows), flight (of resident outward investment), and retrenchment (of resident 
outward investment). They found that external factors, notably global risk aversion (as measured 
by the VIX), drove most of the extreme phases economies experienced between 1980 and 2009. 
This is in line with Fratzscher (2012), but both studies included AMs and EMs introducing 
endogeneity, and they did not necessarily capture some of the fixed country effects such as 
persistent growth potential and long-run interest rate differentials. Forbes and Warnock (2012) 
further argued that rather than using net portfolio flows it is crucial to differentiate between 
                                                 
4 The VIX is the Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility index. It measures the level of risk, fear, or stress in the 
market and is based upon S&P 500 options prices. 
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capital in and outflows because foreign and domestic investors respond to shocks differently. 
Usually, foreign and domestic investors tend to have different degrees of access to liquidity and 
exchange rate exposure. As a result, their reactions can either counterbalance each other, 
negating some of the volatility in net flows or magnify one another, increasing the volatility of 
net flows 
Ahmed and Zlate (2014) took a different approach to Forbes and Warnock (2012) by 
focusing on a continuous timeframe rather than episodes of “surges” and “stops” as these 
episodes are by definition not very common. As a result, it is questionable how much or even if 
the results hold true in normal/non-extreme times, and how much of the “surge or stop” is a 
consequence of oversized movements in the independent variable that also influence these flows 
in normal times (Ahmed and Zlate, 2014). Because my paper focuses on long-term trends and 
drivers in equity and bond flows to EMs, I take the same approach and focus on a continuous 
timeframe from 2000Q1 to 2018Q3 in my model. Ahmed and Zlate (2014) delved into the 
determinants of net capital flows to EMs and investigated if there have been significant changes 
in net capital flows since the GFC. The variables they considered within a panel regression 
model were: GDP growth and monetary policy rate differentials between the U.S. and EMs, 
global risk aversion (as measured by the VIX), number of capital control measures, and the 10-
year U.S. Treasury yield (from 2002Q1 to 2003Q1) and U.S. large-scale asset purchases (LSAP) 
(from 2003Q1 to 2012Q2) as a measure of U.S. unconventional monetary policy. The basic 
model included only the first three as external explanatory variables while additional 
specifications (which I will go over in subsequent sections) added capital controls and 
unconventional monetary policy measures. The results for the basic model show that growth and 
interest rate differentials are significant drivers of net portfolio flows to EMs, but that especially 
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global risk aversion plays an important role in explaining net portfolio flows. Additionally, when 
we compare the pre to the post-GFC model the significance of growth differentials diminished 
while the importance of interest rate differentials doubled, showing that since the GFC investor 
and subsequent portfolio flows have been more sensitive to differentials in AM and EM interest 
rates. However, once they included country and time fixed effects only global risk aversion 
remained significant, supporting the idea that the fixed effects “may partly be capturing the long-
standing growth potential and long-run interest rate differentials” between AMs and EMs 
(Ahmed and Zlate, 2014). Ahmed and Zlate (2014) also highlighted that the pre-crisis model is 
not ideal for predicting post-crisis net portfolio flows suggesting that there have been structural 
changes since the GFC; additional variables such as unconventional U.S. monetary policy are 
needed to explain the fundamental differences. Some drawbacks to Ahmed and Zlate (2014) are 
that they used a concurrent instead of a lagged model which can skew results for slow moving 
variables including LSAP that take time to materialize in financial flows data. Lastly, even after 
discussing the importance of domestic factors the only country-specific variable they included is 
capital controls.   
Hannan (2017) attempted to fill this gap by specifically studying both the effect of country-
specific “pull” and global “push” factors on capital flows to EMs post-GFC. Similar to Forbes 
and Warnock (2012) and different from Ahmed and Zlate (2014), he emphasized the importance 
of distinguishing between net and gross flows and type of instrument (debt, equity, FDI, and 
bank flows) since results can vary drastically across different specifications of capital flows. 
Other than most research on international capital flows, Hannan (2017), similar to Ahmed and 
Zlate (2014), used a fixed effects panel regression rather than a more complicated vector 
autoregression (VAR) framework. The broad application of various versions of VAR models in 
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the reviewed literature is because they capture the dynamic relationship between capital flows 
and monetary policy. It also addresses endogeneity issues within multivariant time-series data 
that a simple panel regression cannot capture and allows for multiple dynamic variables within 
the model.  
Ahmed and Zlate (2014) and Hannan’s (2017) methodologies validate my decision to use a 
panel regression. But unlike their papers, I incorporate lags to get some of the same dynamic 
time-variant effects as the VAR model. Hannan (2017) included a number of variables vis-à-vis 
the U.S. along with the more traditional “push” and “pull” factors (see Table 2 for a full set of 
variables) and country fixed effects as explanatory variables. He investigated all types of capital 
flows (i.e., net, gross, bond, equity, etc.) and normalized them with a country’s GDP. He 
analyzed a sample of 34 EMs from 2009Q3 to 2015Q4 to capture the 2009/10 recovery in EM 
capital flows. His results concluded that for portfolio debt inflows global risk aversion (as 
measured by the VIX), GDP growth differentials and a host of domestic structural factors I will 
expand on in Section 3.4 were statistically significant. On the contrary, for portfolio equity 
inflows none of the push/pull or “push” variables were significant. Hannan (2017) acknowledged 
that the results were influenced by the short timeframe considered along with the fact that some 
of the indicators are slow moving and will not be “felt” until several quarters or years later. 
When looking at high and low episodes of capital flows (defined as one standard deviation above 
or below the mean), the results show that for debt flows risk aversion and growth differentials 
were no longer significant but rather interest rate differentials, U.S. corporate spreads, and the 
U.S. yield gap were essential drivers. On the other hand, for equity flows growth and interest rate 
differentials along with U.S. corporate bond spreads determined inflows to EMs. Overall, risk 
aversion and U.S. corporate spreads seem to have been the main determinants of capital inflows 
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since the GFC but extending the timeframe of Hannan’s (2014) study and introducing lags 
(Hannan and Pagliari, 2017; Forbes and Warnock, 2012) will contribute to the existing literature 
in a meaningful way.      
The abundance of variables, timeframes, countries, and models past literature has looked at 
over the years can be overwhelming. In summary, the most critical global “push” factors 
throughout the existing literature I identify and include in the panel regression are expected GDP 
growth and interest rate differentials (long-run and short-run) vis-à-vis the U.S., and global risk 
aversion (VIX). Additionally, I will contribute to the existing literature by focusing on gross 
equity and bond inflows to emerging Europe, a widely under-researched geographical area with 
regards to this topic, rather than a combination of AMs and EMs or a seemingly random highly 
heterogeneous group of EMs, which seems to be customary for this area of research.     
 
3.2 U.S. Conventional Monetary Policy 
There exists a plethora of literature on the unintended spillover effects from U.S. monetary 
policy on EM capital flows. Chen et al. (2014) study three main questions: 1) The impact of U.S. 
monetary policy surprises on capital flows and asset prices in EMs; 2) Do the spillover effects 
vary across conventional and unconventional U.S. monetary policy phases? 3) Are structural 
domestic economic conditions a safeguard against spillovers. I will discuss their findings and 
implications on the first question in this section and will come back to review their contributions 
to questions two and three in Sections 3.3 and 3.4 respectively.  
Chen et al. (2014) carried out an event study using data from 21 EMs, selected based on EMs 
international financial integrations and overall market liquidity, across three time periods: 
Conventional monetary policy phase (CMP) from January 2000 to July 2007, unconventional 
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monetary policy including the Fed’s LSAP from November 2008 to May 2013 (UMP-P), and the 
unconventional monetary policy phase commencing with the tapering of QE from May 2013 
until March 2014 (UMP-T). The event study used a 2-day window to measure the impact of a 
monetary policy surprise on financial markets; it sought to identify short-term effects on capital 
flows rather than capturing long-term persistence effects. Chen et al. (2014) also extended past 
research by deploying a factor analysis to capture not just short-term but also long-term 
variations in U.S. bond yields. They calculated two factors called market and signal factor, which 
combined explain 99 percent of the variation in US bond yields (Chen et al., 2014). Chen et al. 
(2014) defined the market factor as: “encompassing the portfolio rebalancing channel of 
monetary policy, as well as any other information the Fed communicates about the supply of 
bonds that will be available to private investors, and long-term risks to (or uncertainty about) 
growth, inflation and changes to central bank preferences and objectives.” On the other hand, the 
signaling factor loaded on the Fed’s future short-term policy path. The results showed that U.S. 
monetary policy shocks do significantly affect capital inflows and asset prices in EMs, but the 
spillover effects are only a recent development, having been small or insignificant before the 
GFC. Also, signaling surprises regarding the Fed’s future policy path nearly always led to more 
substantial spillovers than market surprises. However, because market surprises are less 
predictable the Fed and other AM central banks need to watch the effect, they have on long-term 
bond yields during the ongoing tapering process while also effectively communicating the future 
policy path.  
Rather than conducting an event study, Georgiadis (2016) utilized a GVAR model to 
examine the long-term determinants of U.S. monetary policy output spillovers to the rest of the 
world. He used a sample of 61 AMs and EMs from 1990Q1 to 2009Q4 and found that a 100 
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basis point contractionary U.S. monetary policy shock had significant spillover effects on real 
GDP growth in all sample countries.5 Interestingly, the spillover effects in most countries from 
the sample were even more extensive than the domestic effects for the U.S. Of importance to my 
research, his findings show that spillovers to Eastern European countries, Greece and Ireland 
were particularly large. The rest of the paper delves into the importance of country 
characteristics as determinants and resulting policy implications for EMs. In a general-to-specific 
approach, Georgiadis (2016) determined that trade and financial integration, the manufacturing 
share, institutional quality, financial system competition and depth, labor market rigidities, de 
jure financial openness are statistically significant variables. However, I will focus on financial 
integration, institutional quality, and financial openness (as measured by capital inflow 
restrictions) for my empirical model. Given his findings on the large spillover effects of U.S. 
monetary policy, Georgiadis (2016) raised the question of whether domestic monetary policy in 
economies outside of the U.S. has been undermined by financial globalization. While countries 
can to some degree shield themselves from spillover effects through trade integration, domestic 
financial market development, increasing the flexibility of exchange rates, and reducing tensions 
in labor markets he sees globalization as a big problem for the growth and development of EMs.   
Koepke (2018) contributed to the literature by studying the effect of changes in Fed policy 
rate expectations on international portfolio flow movements from 2010-13. His paper is different 
from previous literature in that it used policy rate expectations rather than market-based yields on 
U.S. Treasury bonds to proxy interest rates (Anaya et al., 2017) or U.S. monetary policy 
variables, such as the federal funds target or effective rate (i.e., Ahmed and Zlate, 2013). Koepke 
(2018) argued that if the Efficient Market Hypothesis is in fact correct, meaning markets are 
                                                 
5 One basis point is equal to one-hundredth of one percent or 0.01%. 
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truly efficient, and asset prices fully reflect all available information including Fed policy path 
expectations, capital flows to EMs should be predominantly driven by divergences between real 
and expected interest rates (i.e., rates rise faster or slower than expected). In a process similar to 
Dahlhaus and Vasishtha (2014), Fed policy rate expectations were calculated using federal funds 
futures contracts. Additionally, the author is the only one thus far to have used both high-
frequency EPFR fund flows, and international portfolio flows data as measured in the BoP. This 
is important because researchers have found some contradicting results using the different 
datasets. Koepke (2018) found that across both EPFR fund flows and BoP portfolio flow data 
changes in Fed policy rate expectations are a significant determinant of portfolio flows to EMs, 
especially for debt flows; a one percentage point shift in Fed interest rate expectations is 
estimated to reduce EM portfolio flows by $15.3 billion. On top of that, the results show that 
shifts toward tighter monetary policy were on average five times more impactful than shifts 
toward policy easing. Also, the pace of asset purchases by the Fed did not play a statistically 
significant role in determining portfolio flows. The findings of this paper suggest that more so 
than anything else effective communication and “appropriate anchoring of market expectations” 
by the Fed is of utmost importance for global financial order (Koepke, 2018). 
Past research found U.S. monetary policy to have significant spillover effects on EM capital 
flows and asset prices. Utilizing panel regressions similar to this paper, Ahmed and Zlate (2014) 
and Hannan (2017) both found EM central bank policy rates relative to the Fed’s effective 
federal funds rate to be significant drivers of portfolio flows, especially in the post-GFC period. 
As such I include emerging European central bank policy rates vis-à-vis the effective federal 




3.3 U.S. Unconventional Monetary Policy 
When the Fed lowered the federal funds target rate to effectively zero on 17 December 2008, 
it ran out of conventional monetary policy instruments to steer the U.S. economy out of the GFC. 
To further stimulate the economy and encourage banks to lend, the Fed underwent three rounds 
of QE, the buying of mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and U.S. Treasury notes to increase 
liquidity and further ease financial conditions. From 2008 until the first announcement by former 
Fed chairman Ben Bernanke to end QE in May 2013 also referred to as the “Taper Tantrum” the 
Fed’s balance sheet ballooned from $900 billion to over $4 trillion (FRED). QE had and 
continues to have large financial market and capital flow implication especially for less 
developed EMs; as a result, it has been a subject of interest for economic literature.        
In addition to concluding that U.S. monetary policy shocks affect capital inflows and asset 
prices in EMs, Chen et al. (2014) also studied the spillover variations across CMP and UMP. 
They looked at a total of 125 U.S. monetary policy surprises, broken down into signal and 
market factors, across three periods: 74 for CMP from January 2000 to July 2007, 42 for UMP-P 
from November 2008 to May 2013, and 9 UMP-T from May 2013 until March 2014. The results 
show that for the CMP phase neither signal nor market factors had significant spillover effects 
exception for a signal surprise on equity flows. For both UMP phases, market and signal surprise 
grew statistically significant for bond yields, exchange rate, and portfolio flows. Of notice is that 
market surprises grew more significant over the three policy phases while signal surprises grew 
larger for bond yields and equity flows but decreased for equity prices and exchange rates 
relative to the UMP-P phase. This suggests that UMP mostly affected long-term bond yields and 
exchange rates. Market and signal surprises grew statistically more significant in the three 
samples, and signal surprises nearly always had larger spillover effects, but on average UMP-P 
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shocks were larger than UMP-T shocks. In summary, the results Chen et al. (2014) present are in 
line with most recent research in that they found unconventional monetary policies to have larger 
spillovers per unit of surprise than conventional policies; however, the small sample size for 
UMP U.S. monetary policy shocks suggests further research is needed.   
Anaya et al. (2017) built upon Chen et al. (2014) by using the size of the Fed balance sheet to 
classify unconventional monetary policy rather than monetary policy shocks. Furthermore, they 
employed a global VAR model to capture the dynamic nature between financial and real 
variables over time and between countries and include the role of economic characteristics of 
countries as a determinant of capital flows.  
Specifically, Anaya et al. (2017) studied the effect of U.S. unconventional monetary policy 
shocks on portfolio equity and bond flows as well as financial conditions (asset prices and 
exchange rates) in 39 AMs and EMs from 2008-14. On top of that, due to the substantial 
heterogeneity in individual countries found by most existing research, I will discuss their 
methodology and findings on structural domestic “pull” characteristics across emerging Latin 
America, Asia, and Europe in Section 3.4. Beside the UMP shock in the form of Fed balance 
sheet expansion (i.e., QE), Anaya et al. (2017) looked at a vector of endogenous variables that 
include: EM GDP growth, short-term interest rates, exchange rates, global risk aversion (as 
measured by VIX), and equity returns. The results indicate that U.S. unconventional monetary 
policy does significantly impact portfolio flows to EMs for almost six months; however, in 
absolute terms, the magnitude of the effect is minor (Anaya et al., 2017).                
Ahmed and Zlate (2014) investigated the impact U.S. unconventional monetary policy has 
had on net capital and portfolio flows using 10-year Treasury yields as well as LSAP to further 
isolate more directly unconventional monetary policy actions. In line with the other papers 
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reviewed in this section, their results showed a statistically significant negative impact for U.S. 
Treasury yields, and a positive impact for LSAP on net portfolio flows to EMs. This means that 
as the Fed expanded (tapered) the LSAP, net portfolio inflows to EMs increased (decreased).        
Dahlhaus and Vasishtha (2014) expanded on the subject of tapering QE by studying the 
effect of monetary policy normalization on portfolio flows to EMs using a GVAR model. They 
described a “policy normalization shocks” as an increase in both U.S. long term yield spreads of 
120 bps (in line with the 112 bps increase in yield spreads following former Fed chairman 
Bernanke’s famous “Taper Tantrum” speech on 22 May 2013) and monetary policy expectations 
(as measured by the federal funds futures rate) while keeping the federal funds rate unchanged. 
The sample included weekly portfolio investment flow data from EPFR for 23 EMs from 
January 2004 until January 2014. Results showed that a 120 bps increase in bond yield spreads 
decreases capital flows as a percentage of GDP by 0.5% on impact, increasing to an accumulated 
average of 1.2% and 1.7% over three and six months, respectively (Dahlhaus and Vasishtha, 
2014). In absolute terms, the impact of these results might seem relatively small, but episodes 
such as the one following the “Taper Tantrum” which saw a decrease in portfolio flows to EMs 
by 1% of GDP can have a significant impact on financial volatility in EMs. In line with other 
literature, Dahlhaus and Vasishtha (2014) also found that equity flows are more volatile while 
bond flows are more sensitive to AM monetary policies.  
Interestingly, there were significant variations in the effect of “policy normalization shocks” 
on different countries in the sample. On impact, capital flows to Hungary and South Africa 
decreased by 1.5%, while portfolio flows to Bulgaria and Venezuela remained largely unaffected 
(-0.1% of GDP for both). Similarly, the twelve-month cumulative effect ranged from -5.83% of 
GDP for Hungary to -0.41% of GDP for Bulgaria and Venezuela (Dahlhaus and Vasishtha, 
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2014). Dahlhaus and Vasishtha (2014) hypothesized that domestic structural “pull” factors could 
help explain the differences and shed more light on the interaction between EM capital inflows 
and U.S. monetary policy spillovers.   
 
3.4 Domestic Structural Factors  
Domestic structural factors also defined in the literature as “pull” factors help explain some 
of the heterogeneity found on this topic in recent academic research. This section relates the 
findings on the effect of domestic “pull” factors on EM capital flows of papers discussed in 
previous sections, before highlighting three papers that focus on emerging Europe.  
After identifying significant cross-country variations, Chen et al. (2014) extended their 
research to include domestic country characteristics. They controlled for macroeconomic and 
financial characteristics and concluded that while neither feature is significant for the CMP 
phase, strong macroeconomic fundamentals matter during both UMP phases. Higher real GDP 
growth and current account surplus along with lower inflation and share of local debt held by 
foreigners significantly dampened spillover effects to EMs; no such effect was found for the 
financial variables market size and liquidity. Chen et al. (2014) were quick to point out the major 
policy implications of their results for EM governments. The results show that there is at least 
some shared responsibility for EMs in diminishing the spillover effects of U.S. monetary policy; 
however, given the small sample size for the UMP-T phase (only nine observations), more 
research is needed to draw any conclusions.  
Ahmed and Zlate (2014) added two additional variables, capital control measures, and 
foreign exchange (FX) intervention, in their model to get a more holistic view on the 
determinants of net capital inflows to EMs. They defined capital control measures in two ways: 
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1) “the cumulative number of measures in place in any given quarter” and 2) “the number of new 
measures introduced in any given quarter” (Ahmed and Zlate, 2014). The authors found that 
even though capital control measures were not successful in preventing surges inflows post-
GFC, both capital control variables significantly reduced the spillover effects for total and net 
portfolio inflows. Similarly, the cumulative FX interventions over the prior two years 
significantly increased net total and portfolio inflows prior to and during the GFC but not in the 
post-crisis model. Ahmed and Zlate (2014) offered explanations for the insignificance of FX 
interventions in the post-crisis model including endogeneity issues and problems associated with 
lagging FX intervention for two years by using GFC FX intervention to explain flows for the 
post-crisis period. As a result, I do not include FX intervention in my model and instead focus on 
capital inflow restrictions and other more robust macroeconomic and financial characteristics.            
In addition to the variables mentioned above, Byrne and Fiess (2015) considered financial 
openness (as measured by the Chin-Ito-index), human capital, quality of institutions, and 
domestic economic growth.6 Their results suggest that de jure financial openness along with the 
quality of institutions are highly important drivers of aggregate and disaggregate portfolio flows, 
especially with regards to bond flows. On the other hand, Byrne and Fiess (2015) found no 
evidence that domestic economic growth and human capital bear any significance in determining 
capital flows.           
Contrary to the last two papers, Forbes and Warnock (2012) found that domestic country 
characteristics are poor determinants of capital flows during extreme episodes (defines as surges, 
stops, flight, and retrenchment). The variables they include are capital controls, financial 
openness, GDP per capita, and debt to GDP. They concluded that with the exception of debt to 
                                                 
6 Human capital is “measured by the Institute of Health Metrics and Evaluation data on the educational attainment 
of the total population of 25-year olds and over” (Byrne and Fiess, 2015). 
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GDP none of the other variables help explain waves in international capital flows. While Forbes 
and Warnock (2012) presented findings against the importance of domestic “pull” factors, they 
focused on extreme episodes of capital flows and included both AMs and EMs in their sample. 
In contrast, I am studying a continuous timeframe to get a sense of the drivers of capital flows 
during normal times, which are by definition more common, and only include EMs to avoid 
endogeneity.  
Fratzscher (2012) showed in his paper that “push” factors were the main driver of capital 
flows during the GFC, but domestic “pull” factors have been particularly important since then 
especially for EMs in Latin America and Asia. In line with Chen et al. (2014) and Byrne and 
Fiess (2015), he found the quality of institutions and a current account surplus to be significant 
determinants of capital flows to EMs.7 Additionally, Fratzscher (2012) splits the sample into 
geographic sub-sections including emerging Asia, Europe, and Latin America. The results 
highlight that domestic “pull” factors, while still significant, seem to be less critical in driving 
capital flows to emerging Europe compared to emerging Asia and Latin America. Most likely, 
this distinction is due to the proximity to and integration of emerging Europe with the EZ and the 
associated European Central Bank (ECB) monetary policies; however, further research in the 
form of this paper is required. 
Diving deeper into the geographical area of interest for this paper, in a report by the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), Bakker and Klingen (2012) found that the size of the current 
account imbalance prior to the GFC followed by the exchange rate regime were most important 
in accounting for diverse country-specific outcomes in emerging Europe. While this is not an 
empirical paper, the authors did find strong evidence that countries with low external balances 
                                                 
7 Quality of institutions is based upon the International Country Risk Guide’s financial and political institutions 
criteria as well as the IMF’s sovereign rating of a particular country. 
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(i.e., Poland) experienced stronger growth after the GFC than countries with large pre-crisis 
current account deficits (i.e., Croatia, Romania, and Latvia).   
Allegret and Sallenave (2015) expanded on this topic using a panel regression model; they 
analyzed the determinants of short-term interest rates for a sample of nine emerging European 
countries (Bulgaria, Croatia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, and Serbia) 
to understand why domestic monetary policy did not prevent capital inflows prior to and during 
the GFC. While this does not directly pertain to my research on the determinants of capital flows 
it provides insight into the important domestic variables that affect monetary policies in 
emerging Europe. The results show that inflation (as measured by seasonally adjusted CPI) and 
financial and trade integration in the form of EU membership are significant positive domestic 
variables for determining monetary policy8.  
Similarly, using a GVAR model Eller et al. (2014) found domestic GDP growth, inflation (as 
measured by seasonally adjusted CPI), and European trade integration/EU membership to be 
significant variables in explaining differences in post-GFC U.S. monetary policy shock effects 
on Turkey and Poland’s real economy. The authors examined the impact of the Fed’s May 2013 
tapering announcement on the economic performance of Turkey and Poland’s economic 
development relative to before the shock. Because Chen et al. (2014) and Byrne and Fiess (2015) 
found compelling evidence that domestic GDP growth is a driver of capital inflows to EMs, the 
trade integration /EU membership variable used by Eller et al. (2014) will have second-degree 
ripple effects in explaining portfolio inflows.   
The above research speaks to the importance of microeconomic country-specific variables in 
determining portfolio debt and equity flows to EMs. Similar to Fratzscher (2012) and Byrne and 
                                                 
8 The seasonal adjusted CPI, Consumer Price Index, measures the weighted average cost of a basket of consumer 
goods and services adjusted for predictable seasonal patterns. 
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Fiess (2015) I include capital inflow restrictions (measures financial openness), institutional 
quality, financial development, the current account balance, and inflation in my regression. 
Additionally, based on the research by Allegret and Sallenave (2015) and Eller et al. (2014) I 
include dummy variables for EU and EZ membership.  
I fill a gap in the current literature on the drivers of capital flows by focusing on an 
understudied region, emerging Europe, differentiating between EMs and FMs, and comparing 
the importance of determinants for the two sub-regions, something that has not been done before. 
Additionally, I include both concurrent and lagged U.S. monetary policy shocks as well as a 
vector of concurrent and lagged exogenous and endogenous variables. This paper is not 
representative of all EM and FM economies, but it aims to help policymakers in emerging 
European countries better understand the spillover effects and U.S. monetary policy and main 
drivers of portfolio inflows. Moreover, differentiating between more developed EMs and less 
advanced FM economies gives policymakers in these countries further insight into the factors 
that drive non-residents to invest in the region and how these drivers may or may not change 
once a country moves up or down in MSCI classification. 
 
4 Data 
Using a balanced quarterly sample of eleven EM and FM economies over the period 2000Q1 
to 2018Q3, this paper employs a panel regression framework to examine the determinants of 
portfolio equity and debt inflows. I combine data from various sources (see Table 6) to come up 
with my dataset; due to data availability issues for sovereign debt spread, capital restrictions, 
institutions, and financial development, some results are limited to a smaller date range. In 
particular, regressions including the last three variables mentioned above are limited to quarterly 
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data from 2000Q1 to 2016Q4. I discuss my rationale for focusing on gross inflows and EMs and 
FMs from Europe in the literature review above. As mentioned before, this paper contributes to 
the existing literature by not only studying emerging Europe as a whole but also differentiating 
between EM and FM economies within the region. As can be seen in Table 2, the countries 
included are five EMs (Czech Republic, Greece, Hungary, Poland, Turkey) and six FMs 
(Croatia, Estonia, Lithuania, Kazakhstan, Romania, and Slovenia). Estonia is excluded from all 
regression result that include sovereign interest rate spreads because quarterly sovereign bond 
spread data is not available.   
To construct the dependent variable, I use quarterly portfolio equity and bond inflows data 
from the IMF BoP series normalized by quarterly seasonally adjusted real GDP of the recipient 
country retrieved from Bloomberg. I choose portfolio inflows because various instruments 
behave differently, and I seek to capture the behavior of foreign equity and debt security 
investors. Similar to quarterly GDP, I retrieve the data for risk aversion (as measured by the 
VIX), sovereign bond spreads, and EU and EZ membership from Bloomberg. I take the average 
value of the VIX for a given quarter as a proxy for risk aversion. Sovereign bond spread 
differentials are in bps and measure the amount recipient country 10-year bond yields are above 
the U.S. 10-year treasury yield. Due to data availability limitations, I do not have a complete data 
sample for all FM economies and therefore use it in regressions selectively. EU and EZ 
membership are dummy variables that take on 0 when the country is not a member of the EU or 
EZ and 1 when the country is a member.  
Contrary to sovereign bond spread data and in line with past research, central bank policy 
rate differentials are measured in percentage, not bps. This data, along with CPI, was collected 
from the IMF’s International Financial Statistics dataset. I use total assets held by the Fed to 
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capture the central bank’s unconventional monetary policy path following the GFC. This data 
was used as a proxy for the Fed’s LSAP program and collected from the St. Louis Fed’s Federal 
Reserve Economic Data (FRED) database. Data for the expected GDP growth was retrieved 
from the IMF’s quarterly World Economic Outlook (WEO) reports. I use expected instead of 
real GDP growth differentials to capture investor projections in allocating portfolio equity and 
debt flows. Investors allocate capital based on projections not realized growth because in 
agreement with the Efficient Market hypothesis whatever news happened is already priced into 
the market. Data for capital restrictions, institutional quality, and financial development is only 
available on an annual basis, so I implement the yearly values for all four quarters. Contrary to 
most other research on this topic (e.g., Byrne and Fiess, 2015; Hannan and Pagliari, 2017), I do 
not use the Chin-Ito index to measure financial openness because there is a lack of variability in 
the estimate for seven out of the eleven emerging European countries. Instead, I adopt a dataset 
on capital control measures created by economists Fernandez et al. (2015) in collaboration with 
the IMF. They have compiled the most comprehensive dataset available on financial openness by 
codifying the IMF’s Annual Report on Exchange Rate Arrangements and Restrictions 
(AREAER). They are also the only ones to distinguish between ten different asset classes, thirty-
two total transaction categories, and whether they are inflows or outflows. I use the Overall 
inflow restrictions index, which is scaled from zero to one (zero being the best and one being the 
worst) and averages total inflow restrictions across all ten asset classes and thirty-two transaction 
categories. Because of the classification of financial openness with capital inflow restrictions 
rather than de jure financial openness the expected sign for my results will be negative not 
positive (e.g., Byrne and Fiess, 2015; Georgiadis, 2016; Hannan and Pagliari, 2017). I implement 
the World Bank’s World Governance Indicator as a measure of institutional quality by equal 
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weight averaging a country’s score across the six dimensions of governance (Voice and 
Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of Violence, Government Effectiveness, 
Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption). The World Bank makes use of 
thirty individual data sources produced by a variety of survey institutes, think tanks, NGOs, 
international organizations, and private sector firms in computing the individual scores which 
can range from -2.5 to 2.5. Lastly, I collect the financial development data from an IMF paper by 
Svirydzenka (2016). Before his paper, the primary indicators used by researchers to proxy 
financial development were the ratio of private credit to GDP or stock market capitalization to 
GDP. However, these proxies do not consider the complex multidimensional nature of financial 
development (Svirydzenka, 2016). The index, which is scaled from zero to one takes into 
account nine different dimensions and summarizes them in terms of a country’s financial 
institution and market depth, access, and efficiency.  
 
4.1 Summary Statistics 
Table 3 shows summary statistics for the complete sample, while Tables 4 and 5 break up the 
two sub-samples into EM and FM economies, respectively. On average, quarterly portfolio debt 
inflows were $591 million, more than four times as high as portfolio equity inflows which 
averaged $139 million for the entire sample. Due to investor dynamics (see Introduction) and 
size differences, portfolio flow disparities are even larger when comparing EMs and FMs. On 
average, portfolio equity and bond inflows to EMs were twenty-four and more than five times 
larger than those to FMs, respectively ($290 million vs. $12 million for equity inflows and $1.64 
billion vs. $196 million for debt inflows). This disparity along with the relatively large standard 
deviations for portfolio flows due to the wide variety and size of countries included in the sample 
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makes a comparison between the sub-groups difficult. I effectively eliminate this problem by 
normalizing the flows with a country’s quarterly real GDP. Policy rate and sovereign bond 
differentials between emerging European countries and the U.S. average 4.64% and 2.45% 
respectively are fairly similar for both EMs and FMs, and, as mentioned earlier, are slightly 
skewed due to financial market crises in Turkey and Romania in 2001. Emerging European 
countries were expected to grow GDP 0.26% more than the U.S., reaching a high of 4.75% for 
Poland during the GFC. As expected, FM countries were expected to grow twice as fast as EMs 
compared to the U.S. but experience a slightly more volatile GDP growth.   
The VIX is a measure of the stock market's volatility expectations implied by option prices 
and as such is highly volatile variable; I limit the volatility by using the log-transformed variable. 
The Fed balance sheet averages $2.3 billion from 2000 to 2018Q3, ballooning from $580 million 
at the start of the sample period to nearly $4.5 billion in late 2018. Capital restrictions, 
institutional quality, and financial development average 0.28, 0.50, and 0.39 for the full sample 
respectively, and remain bound in a tight range given they are scaled indexes. On average, EMs 
have better institutions, are more financially developed, and have more open capital markets 
compared to FMs. Interestingly, Estonia, a FM economy, has the highest institutional quality 
across the entire sample countries and years. Estonia has had one of the highest institutional 
quality scores in the sample since it joined the EZ. Lastly, over the sample period 60% or close 
to seven of the countries were EU members and two countries were EZ members every year. 
FMs have a slightly higher percentage of EZ members with the adoption of the Euro by Slovenia 
in 2007, Estonia in 2011, and most recently Lithuania in 2015 compared to only a single EZ 




5 Comparison with the earlier methodology 
Following the GFC, much of the research on the drivers of capital flows to EMs, such as 
Forbes and Warnock (2012) mentioned in the literature review above and Ghosh et al. (2014), 
focused on identifying extreme episodes of surges, stops, flight, and retrenchment. The 
assumption was that during these unusual times the drivers of capital flows would be 
significantly different compared to normal times. This is a reasonable hypothesis, and Forbes and 
Warnock (2012) found that contrary to most research on long-term determinants external factors, 
specifically global risk aversion (as measured by the VIX), drove most of the extreme phases, 
while domestic factors were not significant in explaining capital flows. The downside to this 
approach is that it does not necessarily tell us anything about the determinants of capital flows 
during normal times which are by definition much more common and hold for longer periods. As 
a result, it is difficult to find long-term trends and to identify how drivers have changed over 
certain periods (i.e., before, during, and after the GFC). The objective of this paper is to identify 
long-term trends in the determinants of capital flows to emerging Europe and identify differences 
and similarities between EMs and FMs. Therefore, I follow the more conventional approach of 
investigating drivers of capital flows irrespective of the size of the flows.  
Another recent development in the literature on this topic is the distinction between gross and 
net capital flows. As mentioned in Section 2.1.1, contrary to net capital flows, gross capital flows 
differentiate between foreign investment into the host country and resident outward investment. 
This distinction used to be of little importance because EM resident capital outflows were 
typically quite small up to the early 1990s (Koepke, 2015). However, since the early 2000s, EM 
resident capital outflows increased to substantial volumes, meaning net capital flows were no 
longer a good measure for non-residential flows (Koepke, 2015). Hannan (2017), Forbes and 
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Warnock (2012), and Fratzscher (2012) all found significant variations across net and gross 
flows as well as the type of instrument. Hannan’s (2017) results show that while a “search for 
yield” encourages resident’s choice to invest abroad, the growth differential between home and 
recipient country matters for non-residents’ investment. Similarly, Forbes and Warnock (2012) 
found that episodes of net inflow surges result in both surges of investment by non-residents and 
retrenchment of resident capital outflows. I forgo this distinction by solely focusing on the 
drivers of portfolio equity and debt investments of non-residents to recipient countries in Eastern 
Europe. 
Most of the research on the impact of monetary policy on capital flows uses a VAR model 
because it can describe the complex and dynamic behavior of economic and financial time series 
data and is extremely useful for forecasting. It captures the interdependencies among multiple 
variables by modeling each variable on its own lagged values, past lags of other variables in the 
model, and an error term. Following Hannan (2017) and Ahmed and Zlate (2014), I use a fixed 
effects model rather than the VAR framework; however, I incorporate a two-quarter lag to 
capture some similar effects to that of a VAR model. Additionally, I include specifications for a 
concurrent model and one that only lags the monetary policy variables: central bank policy rate 
differentials, sovereign interest rate spreads, and LSAP. I lag the monetary policy measures 
because they affect the economy in numerous complex ways, and it takes time for these effects 
to ripple through the real economy and thus have a significant impact on capital flows. While the 
inside lag, the delay between the time a monetary policy change is needed and the time the Fed 
actually implements it, is relatively short for monetary policy decisions the outside lag, the time 
it takes for change in policy to affect the economy, can take a considerable period before a 
significant portion of the full policy effect is felt and influence individual investment decisions.    
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5.1 Methodology  
I adopt a panel regression similar to that in Hannan (2017) and Ahmed and Zlate (2014). The 
regression's dependent variable is an estimate of portfolio equity and debt inflows to emerging 
European countries as a fraction of GDP (measured in hundred million). Similar to Ahmed and 
Zlate (2014) and Hannan (2016) I introduce central bank policy rate and expected GDP 
differentials vis-à-vis the U.S. along with the U.S. LSAP purchases estimated by the Federal 
Reserve total assets as independent variables. Additionally, Byrne and Fiess (2015) and Chen et 
al. (2014) found global risk aversion (as measured by the VIX index) to be an integral external 
driver of capital flows to EM economies. Various authors (Fratzscher, 2012; Chen et al., 2014; 
Ahmed and Zlate, 2014; Eller et al., 2014; Allegret and Sallenave, 2015; and Byrne and Fiess, 
2015) found evidence that domestic structural variables add a more holistic picture in 
researching the determinants of capital flows. Byrne and Fiess (2015) showed that financial 
openness/capital restrictions is a significant factor. As a result, I implement the most 
comprehensive dataset on capital inflow restrictions from Fernandez et al. (2015) to measure the 
financial openness. Byrnes and Fiess (2015) along with Fratzscher (2012) also discussed the 
importance of high-quality institutions, thus I average the World Bank’s Worldwide Governance 
Indicators to get an indicator for the quality of institutions. In addition to capital inflow 
restrictions and institutions, I include financial development from an IMF working paper by 
Svirydzenka (2016), current account balance, CPI as a measure of inflation and dummy variables 
for EU and EZ membership as domestic variables.   
As mentioned in the previous section I use a fixed-effect regression model rather than the 
more commonly used VAR framework. I include a two-quarter lag for all variables to capture 
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similar effects to those of a VAR model. Lastly, I include fixed effects for both time and country 
effects to capture differences between countries and over time.  
I run five individual regressions for the full sample, EMs, and FMs respectively. The first 
regression includes all external variables except for the sovereign debt spread data which I 
incorporate into the second regression due to data range limitations. Similarly, I run two 
regression for the full model with all domestic factors one including sovereign debt spreads and 
one without the variable. Next, I only use significant variables from previous regressions to run a 
fifth regression for all three-sample datasets. Lastly, I implement interaction terms to compare 
the EM and FM regression results and see whether there are significant differences in capital 
flow determinants for the two emerging European sub-samples. 
 
5.2 Empirical Model  
The core empirical models I use are fixed-effect panel regressions adapted and modified 
from Hannan (2017) and Ahmed and Zlate (2014). 
𝑃𝐼𝑖,𝑡
𝑌𝑖,𝑡
=  𝛼0 + 𝛽1(𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑡−2 − 𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑡−2
𝑈.𝑆.) + 𝛽2(𝐿𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑡−2 − 𝐿𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑡−2
𝑈.𝑆. ) + 𝛽3(𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡−2 − 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−2
𝑈.𝑆.)
+ 𝛽4𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡−2 + 𝛽5𝐿𝑆𝐴𝑃𝑈.𝑆.,𝑡−2 + 𝛿𝑖 + 𝜏𝑡−2 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡−2                                                  (1) 
𝑃𝐼𝑖,𝑡
𝑌𝑖,𝑡
=  𝛼0 + 𝛽1(𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑡−2 − 𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑡−2
𝑈.𝑆.) + 𝛽2(𝐿𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑡−2 − 𝐿𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑡−2
𝑈.𝑆. ) + 𝛽3(𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡−2 − 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−2
𝑈.𝑆.)
+ 𝛽4𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡−2 + 𝛽5𝐿𝑆𝐴𝑃𝑈.𝑆.,𝑡−2 + 𝛽6𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡−2 + 𝛽7𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝑖,𝑡−2 + 𝛽8𝐹𝐷𝑖,𝑡−2
+ 𝛽9𝐶𝐴𝑖,𝑡−2 + 𝛽10𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑖,𝑡−2 + 𝛽11𝐸𝑈𝑖,𝑡−2 + 𝛽12𝐸𝑍𝑖,𝑡−2 + 𝛿𝑖 + 𝜏𝑡−2 +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡−2     (2) 
Equation 1 analyzes the two quarter lagged effects of all external factors (including sovereign 
bond spreads) while Equation 2 further introduces all the country characteristics variables in the 
baseline regression (corresponds to regression 4). The dependent variable,
𝑃𝐼𝑖,𝑡
𝑌𝑖,𝑡
, measures the 
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equity and bond portfolio inflows for a country i over time t in millions of USD as a proportion 
of GDP (Y) in hundred million of USD. In order to account for differences between debt and 
equity portfolio inflows and variations in EM and FM economies, I run both equations for the 
two types of instruments and economies (i.e., Equation 1 with specification: portfolio debt 
inflows to EMs). This results in four different specifications for both equations. 
 The inflows as a percentage of GDP are modeled as a function of a vector of external and 
domestic variables: 𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝑆𝑇𝑅𝑡
𝑈.𝑆.measures the central bank policy rate of an emerging 
European country minus the effective U.S. federal funds rate; 𝐿𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐿𝑇𝑅𝑖,𝑡
𝑈.𝑆.represents the 
spread in bps in the yield of an emerging European 10-year sovereign bond and the 10-year U.S. 
treasury; 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡
𝑈.𝑆.measures the expected GDP growth rate differential between 
emerging European countries and the U.S.; 𝑉𝐼𝑋𝑡measures the global investor risk appetite; 
𝐿𝑆𝐴𝑃𝑈.𝑆.,𝑡acts as a proxy for U.S. unconventional monetary policy and measures the total assets 
held by the Fed; 𝐹𝑂𝑖,𝑡measures capital inflow restrictions and represents a countries financial 
openness to capital inflows (the lower the better); 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑇𝑖,𝑡represents the quality of institutions for 
a country; 𝐹𝐷𝑖,𝑡represents the financial development of a country; 𝐶𝐴𝑖,𝑡 represents a country’s 
current account position normalized by real GDP and aims to capture financial vulnerability; 
𝐶𝑃𝐼𝑖,𝑡 measures inflation in a country; 𝐸𝑈𝑖,𝑡is a dummy variable that equals 1 if a country is a 
member of the EU; 𝐸𝑍𝑖,𝑡is a dummy variable that equals 1 if a country is a member of the EZ 
monetary union; 𝛿𝑖captures time fixed effects; 𝜏𝑡captures country fixed effects; and finally, 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 is 
the stochastic error term which is added to introduce all other variation in equity/debt portfolio 
inflows that cannot be explained by the model. I run all regressions with robust standard errors to 
control for heteroskedasticity and obtain unbiased standard errors for the OLS coefficients. 
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Based on the reviewed literature and theory, I hypothesize that in general central bank policy 
rate differentials, sovereign bond spreads, expected GDP growth differential, large-scale asset 
purchases, institutions, financial development, EU, and EZ membership will have a positive 
effect on equity/debt portfolio inflows. On the other hand, I expect global investor risk aversion 
(VIX) and financial openness to have a negative impact on equity/debt portfolio inflows to 
emerging Europe. Additionally, I hypothesize domestic factors, specifically capital inflow 
restrictions, institutional quality, financial development, and EU and EZ membership along with 
expected GDP growth differentials to be more significant indicators for FM economies (see 
Table 7 for a full summary of my predicted signs).  
 
6 Results and discussion 
This section is divided into five parts. The first section looks at the results for the entire 
sample. In parts two and three, I decompose the sample into EMs and FMs and discuss results 
across portfolio debt and equity inflows respectively. Part four uses interaction terms to quantify 
significant differences in determinants of capital flows to the two emerging European sub-
regions. Finally, in the last segment, I check the robustness of my model specification by 
comparing the results from parts one to three to a two-quarter lagged model for only monetary 
policy channel variables (central bank policy rate and sovereign debt differentials, and LSAP), 
and a concurrent shock model.    
 
6.1 Full Sample 
Table 8 reports the estimation outcomes and robust standard errors in parentheses using the 
five different model specifications (described in Section 5.2) for the entire sample of emerging 
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European economies. Overall, the independent variables for portfolio bond inflows come in 
statistically significant, have mostly the expected sign, and carry economically significant 
magnitudes on the estimates. The results suggest that capital inflow restrictions, institutional 
quality, and EU and EZ membership are all significant drivers of portfolio bond flows to 
emerging Europe. Capital inflow restrictions, institutional quality, and EU membership are 
significant across all three regressions that include domestic variables, while the coefficients for 
EZ membership are all positive and statistically significant for specification four. Out of the four 
significant variables, only capital restriction estimates are in the unexpected direction. An 
increase in portfolio inflow restrictions by Turkey, Greece, and the Czech Republic coupled with 
yield-seeking foreign investors continued to drive debt flows to these countries even with 
deteriorating financial market liberalization. Supporting the results of Allegret and Sallenave 
(2015) and Eller et al. (2014), I find EU and EZ membership both to be positive significant 
drivers of debt flows. EU and EZ membership increase debt inflows as a percentage of GDP by 
4.21% to 5.76%. Similarly, a one unit increase in institutional quality increases the debt-
dependent variable by 10.99% to 12.87%. The latter result is consistent with Fratzscher (2012), 
Ahmed and Zlate (2014), Chen et al. (2014), and Byrne and Fiess (2015) all of which find the 
variables to be positive and statistically significant. The magnitude of the coefficient was slightly 
bigger but still in line with the papers mentioned leading me to believe that institutional quality is 
of greater importance in an economic area with ultra-low interest rates such as the EZ compared 
to emerging Asia and Latin America. This supports my hypothesis that an increase in the quality 
of institutions along with EU and EZ membership allows economies within Europe to be a more 
attractive investment and increase exposure to the global financial system in terms of larger 
portfolio inflows.  
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The results for the full sample portfolio equity inflows are mixed. The estimates for central 
bank policy rate differentials are generally positive and statistically significant for the full model 
with domestic variables and sovereign debt spreads (Regression 4). A one percentage point 
increase in short-term interest rate differentials increased portfolio equity inflows as a percentage 
of GDP by 0.032%, which translates to an additional $32,000 in investment for every $100 
million in GDP. This might seem relatively insignificant, but to put this into perspective, with an 
average GDP of $451 billion this increases equity inflows by an average of $14.43 million. 
Nonetheless, the size of the estimate is roughly 50% smaller than Ahmed and Zlate (2014), but 
in-between the results for Byrne and Fiess (2015) and Hannan (2017). Ahmed and Zlate (2014) 
included AEs in their sample which makes their results less relevant to my findings. On the other 
hand, Byrne and Fiess (2015) studied the pre-crisis period for a sample of EMs and found a 
larger estimate, while the coefficient was smaller in the post-crisis results for Hannan (2017). 
This discrepancy could be due to the smaller significance of central bank policy differentials as a 
driver in the post-crisis period or structural differences in the sample countries. Future research 
should divide the sample period into pre, during, and post-crisis periods to find the answer to this 
question.  
The other significant variables are capital inflow restrictions and EZ membership. Countries 
with less liberalized financial markets saw a decrease of 1.29% to 2.07% in portfolio equity 
inflows. Interestingly, even though Georgiadis (2015) used the Chin-Ito index and I implemented 
Svirydzenka’s capital inflow restrictions index to measure the financial openness of a country the 
magnitude of the results are in line with each other (they are both defined on a scale of 0 to 1).  
EZ members saw a 0.37% to 1.38% increase in equity investment as a percentage of GDP. On 
the other hand, the results suggest that being an EU member actually reduced equity investments 
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by 1.51%. Most of the other portfolio equity inflow explanatory variables are insignificant but in 
the right direction (expected GDP growth, LSAP, institutional quality, and current account). 
The results for bond inflows show that contrary to equity investments central bank policy rate 
differentials are in general statistically insignificant for bond inflows and although mostly having 
a positive effect do also experience adverse effects for models one and three. Even though the 
magnitude of the coefficient is within one thousand of a decimal to Ahmed and Zlate (2014) and 
Georgiadis (2016), it opposes the overall significance of the variable in their findings. I offer 
three explanations for this. First, Feldkircher (2015) found that while still significant due to 
emerging Europe’s proximity, trade and financial integration with the EZ U.S. monetary policy 
shocks have less of an impact on the region than ECB shocks. Additionally, the results of Chen 
et al. (2014) show that U.S. monetary policy spillover effects on EM are only a recent 
development, having been small or insignificant before the GFC. Given the eighteen-year 
timeframe I use in this paper the results are likely to be impacted by the pre-GFC period. Lastly, 
delving deeper into the data I find that results for central bank policy rate differentials are also 
impacted by outliers from Turkey and Romania; removing these data points or Turkey from the 
sample results in significant estimates. In 2001, Turkey went through a banking crisis after 
building up foreign currency debts to the tune of 60% of GDP. After vulnerabilities started to 
show the Turkish lira came under pressure, inflation skyrocketed to 68% in early 2001, and the 
Turkish central bank defended the country’s crawling peg by increasing policy interest rates up 
to 81% higher than rates in the U.S. (Brinke, 2013). From 2000 to 2002, even though policy rates 
were extremely high debt and equity investors pulled large sums of money out of the country. 
Romania went through a similar situation at roughly the same time. High policy interest rates 
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were accompanied by 40% inflation, 11% unemployment, and extensive portfolio capital 
outflows from non-residents (Freedom House, 2018).                
LSAP, the other monetary policy tool implemented to proxy U.S. unconventional monetary 
policy, is insignificant across all regressions for portfolio bond and equity inflows, and mostly in 
the unexpected direction with the exception of regressions three and four for the latter. Contrary 
to current literature the LSAP coefficient for bond inflows is negative, and all the estimates for 
both equity and bond inflows are extremely small. With the adoption of the Euro, Greece, 
Slovenia, Estonia, and Lithuania handed over the ability to conduct monetary policy to the ECB. 
Following the GFC, the ECB (and as a result all EZ countries) adopted ultra-low and even 
negative interest rates which along with slow growth throughout all of Europe made EU and EZ 
country debts unattractive to investors abroad. As a result, portfolio debt inflows to emerging 
Europe and Europe as a whole retreated and remained subdued in the post-GFC period (see 
Figure 2). All of this was going on at the same time as when the Fed implemented its LSAP 
program, increasing the Fed’s balance sheet by nearly $4 billion. The coefficients for sovereign 
debt spreads are statistically significant, but contrary to this paper’s hypothesis and past research 
negative. Similar to the central bank policy rate differentials, this phenomenon can be explained 
by outliers in the data from Turkey and Romania whose bond spread differentials to U.S. 
Treasuries were particularly large from 2000 to 2002 yet still experience large bond and equity 
outflows from non-residents due to domestic crises (see above).   
Expected GDP growth differentials are insignificant for all five regressions, but the 
coefficients are positive for both debt and equity inflows. These results are in line with Ahmed 
and Zlate (2014), who found GDP growth differentials to overall positively impact net portfolio 
flows; but the significance of the variable diminished in the post-crisis period. Structural changes 
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in portfolio flows since the financial crisis can explain this, and future research on this topic 
might want to expand on this paper by differentiating between the pre and post-crisis period. The 
magnitude of the estimate on portfolio equity inflows is in line with aggregate net portfolio flow 
results from Ahmed and Zlate (2014), but while still insignificant three times as high as portfolio 
equity inflow results from Hannan (2017) suggest. Similarly, the magnitude on the bond 
investment coefficient is four times higher than that found by Hannan (2017). I offer two 
possible explanations for this, first Hannan (2017) studied a sample of AEs and EMs rather than 
EMs and FMs, and second, I use expected not actual GDP growth differential numbers. Both can 
help explain the discrepancy, but additional research is needed to provide statistical power.  
Global risk aversion (as measured by the VIX) is insignificant for all five regressions 
regardless of focusing on debt or equity inflows. The magnitude of the coefficient for bond 
(equity) inflows is much larger (smaller) than results from Ahmed and Zlate (2014) and Hannan 
(2017) suggest. Also, interestingly the estimated coefficients for debt and equity flows are in the 
opposite direction for the specifications including domestic variables. While an increase in 
global risk aversion decreases debt inflows, it increases equity inflows. One possible explanation 
for this could be the change in the relationship between global risk aversion, and portfolio 
inflows pointed out by Fratzscher (2012). While an increase in risk before the GFC was 
associated with capital flows out of AEs and into EMs, this effect reversed during the GFC 
inducing a substantial reallocation of capital from many EMs into a few AEs. My results suggest 
that this change is more predominant for portfolio bond inflows. 
Among the remaining insignificant domestic variables, the explanatory power of the current 
account as a percentage of real GDP is marginal, while the coefficients for financial development 




6.2 Emerging and Frontier Market Portfolio Debt Inflows 
Table 9 presents the results for the drivers of EM and FM portfolio debt inflows. Central 
bank policy rate differentials, financial openness, inflation, and EU membership are statistically 
significant for emerging Europe’s EMs, while financial openness, financial development, and 
inflation are drivers for FMs. Similar to the full sample, Eurozone membership and institutional 
quality are the most consistent determinants for both groups. As institutional quality increased by 
one unit, EM debt inflows went up by 11.66% to 19.42%. Similarly, EZ members in EM and FM 
economies increased investments as a percent of GDP by 3.12% to 5.22% depending on 
specification. Generally, the coefficients were larger for FMs which helps explain why half of 
the FM sample countries are currently EZ members, most recently Lithuania adopted the euro in 
2015. On top of EZ membership, being part of the EU was a significant driver for, increasing 
inflows by 4.86% to 5.43% for EMs.  
Monetary policy measures were largely insignificant with the exception of central bank 
policy rate differentials for EMs. EMs could see an increase of 0.06% in debt investment for 
every one percentage point increase in short-term interest rate differential. Domestic structural 
variable were the main drivers of portfolio debt inflows for both EMs and FMs.    
Interestingly, the results also highlight structural differences between the sub-groups. Capital 
inflow restrictions and inflation were significant negative drivers of portfolio debt inflows for 
FMs; but, contrary to past research, (e.g., Chen et al., 2014) had positive effects on EM bond 
investments. The inflow restrictions effect was particularly large for FMs in the post-GFC period 
(see Table 9 regression 4 results). An increase (decrease) in inflow restrictions (financial 
openness), resulted in a 57.70% decrease in foreign debt investment. Current literature on the 
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effect of inflation on portfolio flows is inconclusive. Sarno et al. (2016) found countries with 
lower inflation to attract foreign investment, while a paper by Chen et al. (2014) indicated that 
countries with high capital inflows experience inflationary pressures. My results suggest there 
may be structural differences between EMs and FMs with regards to inflation because both of 
the other papers utilize a diverse dataset of EMs and FMs rather than differentiate between the 
two country types.   
Financial development was insignificant for EMs but had a particularly large effect on debt 
flows to FMs. In line with my hypothesis, a one unit increase in the variable increased portfolio 
debt inflows by 17.49% to 23.13%. This finding leads back to a higher parity in financial 
development between EMs than FMs (see Tables 4 and 5).    
While not statistically significant, expected GDP growth differential had positive coefficients 
for both EMs and FMs, but the estimates for EMs are much larger. I investigate this difference in 
the section with interaction terms. Again, contrary to recent literature the variable LSAP is 
insignificant and extremely small suggesting that due to the proximity to integration with the EZ 
the U.S. LSAP did not significantly affect emerging Europe.   
 
6.3 Emerging and Frontier Market Portfolio Equity Inflows 
The story for portfolio equity inflows is somewhat mixed, as generally the independent 
variables for EM portfolio equity inflows come in statistically significant, have the expected 
sign, and carry economically significant magnitudes on the estimates, while the results for FMs 
are largely insignificant. Table 10 shows the estimated model results and robust standard errors 
in parentheses for all variables included.  
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For EM portfolio equity flows central bank policy rate differentials were the most consistent 
statistically significant variable along with expected GDP growth differentials, capital inflow 
restrictions, and institutional quality. In contrast, LSAP, and EU and EZ membership were the 
main determinants of portfolio equity inflows for FMs.  
In line with Ahmed and Zlate (2012), Chen et al. (2014), Georgiadis (2016), and my 
hypothesis, central bank policy rate differentials, capital flow restrictions/financial openness, and 
institutional quality are significant drivers of investment for both equity and debt securities in 
EMs. Additionally, supporting the findings of Hannan (2014), the estimate on central bank 
policy rate differential for portfolio equity inflows is consistently more significant but smaller 
than that for debt investments. A one percentage point increase in central bank policy rate 
differentials increases portfolio equity flows to EMs by 0.02% to 0.05%.   
While conventional monetary policy was a significant driver of EM equity flows, the 
unconventional monetary policy proxy, LSAP, significantly drove foreign equity investment to 
FMs. A $1 increase in the Fed’s balance sheet, increased portfolio equity inflows by 5.24e-07% 
to 7.31e-07%. While the coefficient is almost negligible, LSAP was implemented in enormous 
quantities, increasing the Fed’s balance sheet by nearly $4.0 billion over the sample period. 
Nonetheless, the overall impact is relatively marginal and only translates to an additional $12 
million in equity inflows per $100 million in LSAP. The magnitude of this finding is in line with 
Anaya et al.’s (2017) results suggesting that LSAP only had a marginal impact on equity inflows 
especially in emerging Europe, which was partially dragged down by weakness in developed 
Europe. However, this still highlights the vast amounts of liquidity the Fed and ECB pumped 
into financial markets, which along with negative real yields on most debt securities in the U.S. 
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and Europe must have created a surge in portfolio equity flows to FMs all around the world 
including in emerging Europe.    
The coefficients for expected GDP growth differentials are comparatively large in magnitude 
and positive for EMs, but small and in the unexpected direction for FM inflows. One reason for 
this is data points surrounding the dot-com bubble and GFC. During those times, high growth 
FM economies faced sizeable non-resident portfolio capital outflows caused by an investor risk-
off move.  
Similar to portfolio debt flows, global risk (as measured by the VIX) is insignificant across 
all regressions for both EM and FM portfolio equity flows, but contrary to debt investment flows 
the estimates are more consistently positive. This is inconsistent with previous literature and 
common knowledge, but an explanation for this can be the way I calculate the global risk 
variable. The VIX index is typically highly volatile and is determined on a daily basis, but this 
paper averages the index’s values over an entire quarter leading to frequency discrepancies and 
smoothening of overall volatility that can explain the insignificant positive coefficient.    
EU and EZ membership are statistically significant and have a positive effect on FMs but are 
in the unexpected direction for EMs. I am assuming that Greece has a significant impact on the 
results for EM portfolio equity inflows as an EU and EZ member that has seen massive equity 
outflows by non-residents since the European sovereign debt crisis. On the other hand, in 
agreement with Eller et al. (2014) and Allegret and Sallenave (2015), my results suggest a 
positive effect for FM economies in joining the euro monetary union and the associated financial 
and trade integration with other member states.      
The coefficients on inflation are once again in different directions for EMs and FMs, 
increasing foreign equity investments for the former and decreasing inflows for the latter. This is 
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further evidence that EM and FM investors react differently to inflationary pressures and 
strengthens my argument that future research should differentiate between the two country 
classifications.  
 
6.4 Emerging and Frontier Market Differences in Drivers 
To further expand the understanding of the relationships among the variables across EMs and 
FMs and to find significant differences in the magnitude of drivers of portfolio inflows for the 
two subgroups I add various interaction terms. I introduce an EM dummy variable (1 if the 
country is an EM, 0 if not) and interact it with all the variables from the full model. Table 11 
highlights some of the key coefficients for the interaction terms. For portfolio debt inflows 
financial development has a significant negative coefficient, meaning the variable has a stronger 
relationship with portfolio debt inflows in FMs. For every 1 unit increase in financials 
development, we expect to see 59.31% more portfolio debt inflows as a percentage of GDP to 
FMs than EMs. Although not significant, this relationship also holds true for portfolio equity 
inflows. For portfolio equity inflows, an increase in capital flow restrictions lead to 2.42% less 
investments to EMs compared to FMs.  On the other hand, institutional quality and EU 
membership have significant positive estimates for portfolio debt and equity inflows. For every 1 
unit increase in institutional quality, we will see 32.71% more portfolio debt inflows as a 
percentage of GDP to EMs compared to FMs. Similarly, for EM EU member countries we 
expect to see 7.07% and 1.43% more portfolio debt and equity inflows respectively. These 
results are partially in line with my hypothesis. Domestic variables, capital inflow restrictions 
and, financial development appear to be more significant indicators for FMs, but institutional 
quality and EU membership are more significant positive estimates for EMs. Contrary to my 
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hypothesis, expected GDP growth differentials and EZ membership are not statistically 
significant drivers for either EMs or FMs.   
 
6.5 Sensitivity to alternative model specifications 
I conduct an extensive series of sensitivity tests, focusing on different time lags by including 
a concurrent model and a specification with two-quarter lags for slow-moving monetary policy 
variables. I include both the full regression with and without sovereign interest rate spreads 
because the number of observations is higher for the latter due to data limitation for FMs.  
   
6.5.1 Full Sample 
The results for portfolio equity and debt inflows are largely robust for both the concurrent 
and lagged specifications. Interestingly, the magnitudes of most domestic variables increased for 
the lagged model while the effect of external factors decreased. The coefficients for capital 
inflow restrictions and institutional quality grew increased for the fully lagged model and grew 
significant for debt and equity investments respectively. The estimate for institutional quality 
changed from -0.33% to 0.82%, suggesting that the effect of institutional quality changes takes 
time to manifest itself in portfolio equity flows. Similarly, with regards to debt investments, the 
coefficient on institutional quality grew in significance from 8.11% to 10.99% for the lagged 
model. On the other hand, the effect of central bank policy rate differentials became less positive 
through the lag (estimate decreased from 0.15 to 0.07) especially for bond inflows suggesting 
that central bank policy rate differentials have a larger impact on portfolio flows for emerging 
Europe in the short term than over time. With the exception of capital inflow restrictions, all 
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significant variables are robust to alternative lag specifications. Tables 12 and 13 show the full 
sample estimates for both debt and equity inflows.          
 
6.5.2 Emerging and Frontier Market Portfolio Debt Inflows 
EM debt inflow sensitivity results behaved very similar to those from the full sample. 
Domestic variables tended to increase in magnitude while external factors mostly decreased 
when I introduced the lag. Capital inflow restrictions are again only statistically significant for 
the fully lagged model and institutional quality increase in importance. Other than the full 
sample, the estimate on EU membership increase and central bank policy differentials actually 
loses significance with the lag, further strengthening my findings that central bank policy rate 
differentials have a larger impact on portfolio debt flows in the short term.  
The results for FM economies summarized in Table 15 are much more interesting. While 
most external variables still decrease in importance, sovereign interest rate spreads and LSAP 
had a larger positive impact on portfolio debt flows. Additionally, the signs for LSAP, capital 
inflow restrictions, and institutional quality actually flip and in the case of capital inflow 
restrictions grow significant by introducing lags into the model. I believe this is largely due to 
differences in short-term and long-term effects of these variables. While capital inflow 
restrictions can prevent foreign investors from withdrawing their money in the short-term it will 
ultimately lead to less investments flowing into a specific country. Similarly, strong institutions 
will make a country a more attractive target for investment but implementing a change to 
strengthen a country’s institutions can lead to short-time hiccups. For both EMs and FMs, the 
estimates for EU membership increased in magnitude, providing evidence that emerging 




6.5.3 Emerging and Frontier Market Portfolio Equity Inflows 
The results for FM portfolio equity flows are even less significant for the concurrent 
model; no variable is statistically significant for the concurrent model. By introducing a two-
quarter lag, the coefficients for EU and EZ membership become statistically significant and 
increase from 0.02% to 0.53% and 0.11% to 0.37% respectively. Additionally, LSAP grows 
more positive and significant when introducing a lag. Nonetheless, the results for FM portfolio 
equity inflows are not robust to different time lags making it difficult to draw any conclusions.  
In contrast, the main findings for EM equity investments are robust and increase in 
magnitude and statistical significance by introducing lags. The estimates on central bank policy 
rate differentials increase from 0.03% to 0.05% and 0.04% to 0.05%, while the expected growth 
differential decreases in magnitude but grows in significance with the lag. Similar to central bank 
policy rate differentials, estimates for capital inflow restrictions are consistently significant and 
grow more negative with lags. Global risk aversion, LSAP, and the current account balance 
normalized for GDP remain insignificant for all specifications. Tables 16 and 17 show the 
coefficients and standard errors for each variable. 
In summary, results for EM bond and equity inflows remained largely robust for different 
time lags, while the results were mixed for FM inflows. For bond inflows, estimates for domestic 
EM and FM variables generally increased in magnitude and significance while external factors 
grew less important by introducing lags. Nonetheless, for the concurrent and lagged model 
domestic variables, specifically institutional quality, capital inflow restrictions, and EU and EZ 
membership, were the main drivers of portfolio debt inflows to both EMs and FMs. The findings 
for EM equity inflows are also mostly robust to different time lags. Coefficients for central bank 
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policy rate differentials and capital inflow restrictions are significant and in the right direction for 
all specifications, while institutional quality is a positive driver but only significant for the fully 
lagged model. FM portfolio equity inflow results are mixed. They are generally neither robust 
nor statistically significant with the exception of EU and EZ membership.     
 
7 Policy Implications 
The findings of this paper have important policy implications for emerging European 
policymakers. Challenges for these countries usually arise when large amounts of capital flow in 
or out of the country (Forbes and Warnock, 2012). Since the GFC, ultra-low interest rates in the 
West have pushed investors to “reach for yield” elsewhere and diversify into higher risk EM and 
FM securities. At the same time, an increase in globalization and the ensuing interconnectedness 
of financial markets has made it significantly easier for people to invest abroad (Georgiadis, 
2016). Given the global financial market integration and mobility of capital, portfolio flows to 
EMs post-GFC have increasingly been influenced by changes in U.S. monetary policy (Chen et 
al., 2014). The magnitude of the spillover effect depends on both external and domestic factors. 
However, while some determinants of portfolio capital flows to emerging Europe such as global 
risk, GDP growth differentials, and contagion cannot be controlled by policymakers, country 
characteristics usually can. This suggests that EM governments should focus on the variables 
they can control such as capital flow restrictions, financial development, the quality of 
institutions, and industry structure and continue to strengthen them (Georgiadis, 2016). The 
results support my findings for EM and FM portfolio debt and equity inflows. Specifically, less 
capital inflow restrictions, increased financial development, and better institutions lead to larger 
portfolio inflows, while international vulnerability, in the form of the current account balance, 
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decreases inflows. Additionally, trade integration with the EU and EZ positively affects portfolio 
debt inflows for emerging Europe and portfolio equity inflows for FMs. Domestic factors are 
crucial for capital flows and can typically be influenced by domestic policymakers, but my 
results suggest that there is also still a need for governments to keep an eye on the GDP growth 
rate differentials to the U.S. as it is a significant driver of portfolio flows to emerging Europe.    
While financial market integration continues to expand, it will be important to monitor if 
EMs are at times at the mercy of the U.S. monetary policy. Findings that U.S. monetary policy 
has a significant impact on EM capital flows (Chen et al., 2014; Georgiadis, 2016; Koepke, 
2018) support the argument that financial globalization has undermined the effectiveness of 
monetary policy in non-US economies. My results suggest that at least for emerging Europe this 
is not the case as central bank policy rate and sovereign debt spread differentials are significant 
drivers of portfolio inflows, but central banks in emerging Europe should still be aware of 
movements in the Fed monetary policy path. Increased forward guidance, a policy tool that has 
been effectively used by the Fed since the GFC, can additionally help central banks around the 
world plan and regulate policy interest rate differentials.    
Globalization has increased the dependence of EM and FM economies on developed markets 
in North America and Europe. The industry structures in these countries typically heavily lean 
toward manufacturing, which is mainly reliant on growth and consumption elsewhere, mostly 
developed markets. With most of the global growth over the next decade projected to come from 
EMs and FMs, understanding the drivers of capital flows to these high growth regions is integral 
not only for domestic policymakers but also central bankers in AEs, specifically from the Fed 
and ECB. While the Fed’s and ECB’s mandate is to deliver domestic price stability and 
sustainable growth, changes in U.S. monetary policy can have significant consequences for EMs 
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and FMs including currency appreciation (depreciation), downward (upward) pressure on 
inflation, and market volatility that can have residual second degree effects on the U.S. economy 
(Chen et al., 2014). This shows the importance, and positive effects cooperation between EMs 
and the U.S. and EZ along with the role of global institutions such as the IMF, World Bank, and 
World Trade Organization can have. This is most definitely applicable right now as the Fed has 
tightened monetary policy and is partially unwinding its balance sheet. Internal coordination 
between the Fed and EM central banks can help dampen current surges and stops in capital 
flows.    
 
8 Conclusion  
Unlike previous research on this topic, my study examines the spillover effects of U.S. 
monetary policy and determinants of portfolio inflows to emerging Europe for both EMs and 
FMs in the region. I expand current research on emerging Europe to include portfolio debt and 
equity inflows and investigate the spillover effects of U.S. rather than ECB monetary policy, 
given the USD’s role as the global reserve currency. I utilize various sources to compile a dataset 
of five external and seven domestic variables identified by previous research for eleven countries 
(five EMs and six FMs) in the region from 2000Q1 to 2018Q3.  
My results confirm that U.S. monetary policy is a significant driver of portfolio inflows to 
emerging Europe. I find that central bank policy rate differentials are particularly important for 
portfolio equity inflows to emerging Europe (the full sample), and both equity and debt 
investments to EMs. On the other hand, long-term sovereign bond spread differentials drive 
portfolio debt inflows to FMs. My results further suggest that above all else having strong 
institutions and developed financial markets along with financial openness and EZ membership 
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in emerging Europe is crucial for monetary policy stability and absorbing monetary policy 
spillover effects (Georgiadis, 2015). As financial markets become ever more intertwined, 
effective communication on forward monetary policy guidance from the Fed will continue to be 
tremendously helpful for central bankers in developing economies. Guidance is also in the self-
interest of the U.S. because U.S. based monetary policy shocks can lead to inflationary pressure 
and currency and asset price volatility abroad which can have feedback effects on the domestic 
economy. I also explore whether there are significant differences in drivers for EMs and FMs. 
The results suggest that while capital inflow restrictions and financial development have a 
stronger effect on debt and equity investments to FMs, the opposite is the case for institutional 
quality and EZ membership.  
Admittedly, there are four key limitations to my paper. The biggest drawback in my study is 
the use of a lagged panel regression instead of a more sophisticated VAR or global VAR model. 
As mentioned several times throughout this paper, a lagged panel regression cannot capture the 
complex and dynamic transmission mechanisms between the various variables and global 
financial markets that affect capital flows. Additionally, limited data availability for FM 
sovereign debt yields significantly reduced the number of observations and timeframe for the FM 
dataset. Similarly, my data collection process for the risk variable is a limitation. Because BoP 
data is only available on a quarterly basis, I had to average the quarterly VIX data. The VIX is 
highly volatile and averaging values over a three-month period diminishes the variables 
explaining power. Lastly, again a data frequency issue data for capital inflow restrictions, 
institutional quality, and financial development is only available on a yearly basis. As a result, 
there is no quarterly variation in the variable which can skew some of the estimates and results.        
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Based on my findings, future research on this topic should, similar to Chen et al. (2014), 
divide the sample period into four monetary policy phases: 1) conventional U.S. monetary policy 
leading up to the GFC, 2) unconventional U.S. monetary policy, 3) unconventional monetary 
policy commencing with the tapering of QE, and 4) Quantitative tightening once the Fed started 
to increase policy rates in December 2015. Investigating whether there are significant differences 
between these different stages of U.S. monetary policy could be of great value for policymakers 
in emerging Europe. Additionally, most academic research, including this one, treats EMs and 
FMs as a homogeneous group when in fact they are rather heterogeneous in their level of 
development and economic structures (Georgiadis, 2015). Differentiating between EMs and FMs 
is a good start but drilling down to the country or small group level could be valuable to better 
understand how the fundamental aspects affect the importance of various capital flows drivers. 
Another promising avenue for future research is exploring the use of high-frequency portfolio 
flows data, such as the monthly and daily data compiled by the Institute of International Finance. 
The IIF data is broadly consistent with BoP principles and allows researchers to conduct event 
studies around specific monetary policy announcements including the announcement of different 
QE programs during the GFC (Koepke, 2015). Such data will allow for a more nuanced insight 
and would particularly be useful for comparing drivers of portfolio flows systematically across 








Table 1: Determinants of Capital Flows (Hannan, 2017) 
Push/Pull Push Pull 
GDP growth differential vis-
à-vis U.S.  
Interest rate differential vis-à-
vis U.S. 
Global risk aversion (log) 
Commodity price growth 
Global liquidity growth 
U.S. Corporate Spread 
U.S. Yield Gap 
Trade Openness  
FX reserves as share of GDP 
Exchange rate regime 
Institutional quality  




Table 2: Country Breakdown 


















Figure 2: Emerging European Portfolio Debt Inflows (2000Q1 to 2018Q3) 
 
 
Table 3: Summary Statistics, Full Sample 
Variables N Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Country code (#) 825 6.00 3.16 1.00 11.00
Year 825 2000Q1 2018Q3
Portfolio equity inflows (million $) 825 138.54 747.18 -2,762.09 8,644.83
Portfolio bond inflows (million $) 825 590.81 3,080.15 -33,009.50 17,321.72
Real GDP, seas. adj. (100 million $) 825 450.78 514.79 13.95 2,439.08
Norm. portfolio equity inflows 825 0.20 1.80 -24.18 16.99
Norm. portfolio debt inflows 825 1.33 6.17 -51.22 35.42
Policy rate differential (%) 825 4.64% 7.90% -2.91% 75.60%
Sovereign bond spread (bps) 550 244.97 324.50 -201.03 3,308.68
Expected GDP growth differential (%) 750 0.26% 1.49% -11.99% 4.75%
VIX (log) 825 2.91 0.35 2.33 4.07
LSAP (millions $) 825 2,266,395 1,545,076 579,454 4,497,297
Capital inflow restrictions 650 0.28 0.22 0.00 1.00
Institutions 748 0.50 0.51 -0.98 1.27
Financial development 748 0.39 0.11 0.12 0.69
Current account (millions $) 825 -1,739.13 3,603.29 -22,681.00 6,655.82
Norm. current account 825 -3.18 6.91 -21.49 34.63
Inflation (CPI) 825 94.15 23.63 18.48 208.88
European Union Dummy 825 0.60 0.49 0.00 1.00


















Table 4: Summary Statistics, Emerging Market Countries 
Variables N Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Country code (#) 375 5.80 3.43 1.00 11.00
Year 375 2000Q1 2018Q3
Portfolio equity inflows (million $) 375 290.10 1,065.49 -2,762.09 8,644.83
Portfolio bond inflows (million $) 375 1,064.08 4,394.46 -33,009.50 17,321.72
Real GDP, seas. adj. (100 million $) 375 789.16 587.81 114.68 2,439.08
Norm. portfolio equity inflows 375 0.37 1.73 -7.82 16.99
Norm. portfolio debt inflows 375 1.40 6.46 -51.22 27.75
Policy rate differential (%) 375 4.95% 9.96% -2.91% 75.60%
Sovereign bond spread (bps) 375 264.98 352.39 -201.03 3,308.68
Expected GDP growth differential (%) 375 0.21% 1.44% -5.74% 4.75%
VIX (log) 375 2.91 0.35 2.33 4.07
LSAP (millions $) 375 2,266,395 1,545,076 579,454 4,497,297
Capital inflow restrictions 340 0.27 0.23 0.00 1.00
Institutions 340 0.59 0.32 -0.16 1.02
Financial development 340 0.46 0.08 0.30 0.69
Current account (millions $) 375 -3,296.39 4,617.55 -22,681.00 6,215.59
Norm. current account 375 -3.70 4.71 -19.09 12.76
Inflation (CPI) 375 94.77 24.17 18.48 208.88
European Union Dummy 375 0.67 0.47 0.00 1.00















Table 5: Summary Statistics, Frontier Market Countries 
Variables N Mean Std.Dev. Min Max
Country code (#) 450 6.17 2.91 2.00 10.00
Year 450 2000Q1 2018Q3
Portfolio equity inflows (million $) 450 12.25 209.11 -1,708.34 3,020.88
Portfolio bond inflows (million $) 450 196.41 991.19 -4,551.51 7,648.47
Real GDP, seas. adj. (100 million $) 450 168.80 152.39 13.96 662.59
Norm. portfolio equity inflows 450 0.06 1.85 -24.18 12.64
Norm. portfolio debt inflows 450 1.26 5.91 -22.74 35.42
Policy rate differential (%) 450 4.37% 5.64% -1.95% 32.87%
Sovereign bond spread (bps) 175 202.09 250.23 -196.02 1,302.14
Expected GDP growth differential (%) 450 0.42% 1.50% -11.99% 4.38%
VIX (log) 450 2.91 0.35 2.33 4.07
LSAP (millions $) 450 2,266,395 1,545,076 579,454 4,497,297
Capital inflow restrictions 408 0.27 0.19 0.05 0.80
Institutions 408 0.43 0.62 -0.98 1.27
Financial development 408 0.33 0.10 0.12 0.58
Current account (millions $) 450 -441.42 1,534.32 -9,033.16 6,655.82
Norm. current account 450 -2.75 8.29 -21.49 34.63
Inflation (CPI) 450 93.63 23.18 27.98 179.02
European Union Dummy 450 0.55 0.50 0.00 1.00

















Table 6: Data Sources 
Variables Frequency Time Coverage Sources 




Quarterly 2000Q1 to 2018Q3 
Financial Flow Analytics 
Database compiled from 
the IMF’s Balance of 
Payments Statistics 
Real GDP, seasonally 
adjusted; VIX; 
European Union and 
Eurozone dummies 
Quarterly 2000Q1 to 2018Q3 Bloomberg 
Sovereign bond spreads Quarterly 
EMs 
2000Q1 to 2018Q3 
FMs  
2011Q1 to 2018Q3 
Bloomberg 
Central bank policy 
interest rates; CPI 
Quarterly 2000Q1 to 2018Q3 
IMF database, 
International Financial 
Statistics (IFS)  
Expected GDP growth Quarterly 2000Q1 to 2018Q3 
IMF’s World Economic 
Outlook (WEO) 
Federal Reserve bank 
total assets 
Quarterly 2000Q1 to 2018Q3 
Federal Reserve (FRED), 




(scale: 0 to 1) 
Annual 2000Q1 to 2016Q4 
Fernandez, Klein, 
Rebucci, Schindler, and 
Uribe (2016), “Capital 
Control Measures: A 
New Dataset”, IMF 
Economic Review 64 
Institutions 
(scale: -2.5 to 2.5) 
Annual 
2000Q1 to 2000Q4 
and                
2002Q1 to 2017Q4 




(scale: 0 to 1) 
Annual 2000Q1 to 2016Q4 
Svirydzenka, K. (2016), 
“Introducing a New 
Broad-based Index of 
Financial Development”, 





Table 7: Predicted Signs 











































































































Table 10: Results for EM and FM portfolio equity flows 
 











Country-Fixed Effects YES YES
Time-Fixed Effects YES YES
Robust standard errors in parantheses











Table 12: Full sample portfolio debt flow robust results 
 




Table 14: EM portfolio debt flow robust results 
 




Table 16: EM portfolio equity flow robust results 
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